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RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Court of Appeals of New York.
TAELINGER v. MANDEVILLE

ET AI.

An agreement between husband and wife for a separation cannot be assailed, because the contracting parties were husband and wife, in action between the suTviving wife and the executors of her deceased husband.
An executed agreement for a separation will not be interfered with, to relieve
either party on the ground of public policy, as this is best subserved by leaving the
parties where they have placed themselves.
Where a husband induced his wife to surrender an agreement of separation for
a sum of money in hand, the wife cannot afterwards sue for the benefits of the surrendered agreement, without first returning the money received, when the defence
made by the husband's executors is a denial of their testator's liability on the
agreement surrendered.

Appeal from Suprenqe Court, general term, fifth department.
Action by Mary A. Tallinger against Austin Mandeville
et al., executors, etc., of Godfrey Tallinger, deceased, to recover on a contract to pay the sum of $iO,OOO. The plaintiff
was non-suited at the Monroe Circuit Court, and appealed to
the general term, where the judgment was affirmed, and appeal
was then taken to the Court of Appeals.
P. Chamberlain,Jr., for appellant.
W. A. Sutherland,for respondents.
EARL, J., (April 16, 1889). On the 26th day of September, 188 1, the plaintiff was married to the defendants' testator,
Godfrey Tallinger, and they commenced to live together as
husband and wife. On the 18th of February thereafter the
testator executed the following instrument:"WHEREAS, I, Godfrey Tallinger, did on the 26th day of September, 1881,
marry my present wife, Mary Tallinger, and did then, in consideration of said
marriage, agree to secure to her the payment of ten thousand dollars upon my
death, provided she should live with me, as my wife, until said time, and should,
in all things, at all times, perform faithfully the duties of a wife, and take
such care of me and my household as I should request, and as should be proper
and reasonable. Now, therefore, I do, in consideration of the premises, agree
with said Mary that ten thousand dollars shall be paid to her at my death, provided she shall faithfully perform all of said conditions on her part, and such performance, in full, shall be a condition precedent to any liability to her upon this
agreement."
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Both parties, at the same time, executed, under seal, an-

other instrument, which was pinned to the former, as follows:
"It i agreed I.etween Godfrey Tallingcr and .Mary Tallinger that the annexed
inqtrument shall, upon its delivery, be depo-ited witi. Satterlee and Yeomans, or
such other person, or per.on.;, a- said parties may agree upon, at any time, to be

re un~, -as thesideGofre
held
helby them until the death of said Godfrey Tallin-er, as the said Godfrey
deires that it should not be made a public mautter, and that the observance of this
agreement upon the part of said .MaryTallinger shall be a condition precedent to
any liability upon said agreement."

The domestic life of Mr. and Mrs. Tallinger soon became
unhappy and inharmonious; and an agreement was made for
a separation, in pursuance of which, on the 2oth day of July,
I882, they executed, under seal, the following instrument:"This agreement, mde this 2oth day of July, ISS2, between Godfrey Tallinger, of Rochester, N. Y., and 'Mary Tallinger, of the same place, witnesseth,
that, in consideration of five thousand dollar., this day paid by said Godfrey to
said Mary, and other valuable con.iderations, it is agreed that said Mary shall
absent her-elf continunuly from, and not visit, the houe of said Godfrey, or communicate with him, or molest him, or make any claim ul on or against him, in any
manner, or against his estate after his death; and will, upon request of any person
interested in the same, after his death,.execute to and deliver to them, release of
dower or other claim or intere.t in the estate of said Godfrey, and the said Mary
does hereby release all claim of dower, or other interest, in any property now.
owned by said Godfrey, or which he may hereafter own; and if said Mary shall
violate any of the conditions or provisions hereof, or shall fail to perform any of
the same, she shall thereupon repay to said Godfrey, his assigns or personal representatives, said S5,ooo.oo and the interest thereon from this date, as liquidated
damages, and she charges her separate estate therewith; and a certain agreement
heretofore executed by said Godfrey and said Mary, whereby he agreed to pay at
his death, upon the perf,,rnance of certain conditions therein expressed, the
sum of $io,ooo.oo, is hereby canceled and abrogated."

Thereafter they lived separate, and Mr. Tallinger died on
the fifth day of December, 1884. The plaintiff claimed dower
in the real estate left by her husband, and it was admeasured
to her, and in October, I886, she commenced this action to
recover the $IOO00 mentioned in the instrument executed
February I8, 1882. In her complaint she alleged an oral
agreement to pay the $ Io,ooo in consideration of her marriage
to the testator, and the subsequent execution of the written
agreement, and that the S io,ooo became due and payable, and
demanded judgment for that sum, with interest from the death
of the testator, The defendants, in their answer, alleged,
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among other things, that the plaintiff did not, after the execution of the written instrument, live with the testator as his
wife, caring for his household, and performing all the duties of
a wife faithfully; but that, on the contrary, she grossly and
willfully failed and neglected to perform her duties in the care
and management of his household, and to sustain the dutiful
relations of a wife; and they set up, as a further defense, the
execution of the instrument of July 20, x882, and demanded
judgment for $5,ooo, as therein specified, for liquidated damages. The plaintiff served a reply, simply denying the allegations of the counter-claim. Upon the trial, the plaintiff gave
-some evidence tending to show misconduct on the part of her
husband, and that she had just cause for separation from him.
The defendants then -proved the instrument dated July 20,
1882, and gave no further evidence. Upon defendants' motion
the court then nonsuited the plaintiff. The judgment entered
upon the nonsuit was, upon appeal to the general term,
affirmed.
On the 2oth day of July, 1882, the plaintiff held the obligation of the testator to pay her -$io,ooo at his death upon
the conditions mentioned. That obligation constituted her
separate estate, and, under the laws of this State, she had the
same right to deal with it as if she were a feme sole. She
could sell, release or discharge it at her pleasure. It was payable upon certain conditions, which might not be performed
by her; and the estate of her husband might not at his death
be sufficient to meet it. Hence, clearly, the instrument, payable at an uncertain time in the future upon the contingencies
mentioned, was not of the value of $io,ooo. It is claimed,
however, on the part of the plaintiff, that, as she was the wife
of the testator, her agreement male with him on the 2oth day
of July, 1882, did not bind her. It is undoubtedly true that,
so far as that agreement remained executory, it could not have
been enforced by Mr. Tallinger, or his executors. But it was
executed. She received in cash $5,ooo, and was released from
the conditions contained in the prior instrument, binding her
to live with him, and faithfully to perform the duties of wife,
and to take care of him and his household during his life.
For the surrender, therefore, of the prior obligation, she re-
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ceivea ample consideration. There is no allegation in the
complaint or reply, and there was no proof upon the trial, that
the consideration of $5,000 paid to her in hand, was not an
adequate consideration for the surrender of the prior conditional obligation of her husband. There has never been a
time in the history of the law, and certainly not since 1848,
when such an agreement between husband and wife relating
to her separate estate, and fully executed, would have been
absolutely void. She surrendered an obligation which she
then held as a part of her separate estate, and in lieu thereof
received $5,ooo in money, and that became her separate estate;
and it never could be held in a forum administering both law
and equity that she could hold the money thus received, and
enforce the obligation which she had surrendered in consideration thereof
Agreements between husband and wife, founded upon
valuable considerations, have frequently been enforced in
equity. She may even sell her separate estate to her husband
for a valuable consideration, and the sale will be upheld in
equity: Whitev. Mager (1862), 25 N. Y. 328; Winans v.
Peebles (1865), 32 Id. 423; Hunt v. Johnson (I87o), 44 Id. 27;
Boydv. De La Ofontagnie (1878), 73 Id. 498. Here, by her
own act, she surrendered, released, and discharged her husband's obligation. Thereafter, she did not in any sense hold
or possess it, and she could regain it, and be reinstated in her
rights under it, only by a suit instituted in equity for that purpose, in which case relief could be granted to her according
to the equities of the case, as they appeared upon the proofs.
The agreement of the 2oth of July, 1882, cannot, therefore,
be assailed in this action, because the parties thereto were
husband and wife.
The further objection is made, on behalf of the plaintiff,
that the agreement of July 2oth was illegal, and against public
policy, as it provided for the separation of husband and wife.
If it were an executory agreement, and either party was seeking to enforce it, the objection would be a good one. But
here the agreement had been executed. She took the $5,000
and gave up her obligation. The law will never interfere, at
the instance of either party, with what has been done in exe-
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cution of an illegal agreement. It simply refuses to enforce
such agreements, or such as are against public policy; but it
never intervenes to relieve either party against them, so far as
they have been executed. It refuses to enforce such agreements, not from any regard or concern for the parties thereto,
but to promote the public policy and the general welfare; and,
so far as they have been executed, they cease to interest the
public, and public policy is supposed to be best subserved by
letting them alone, and leaving the parties to them where they
have placed themselves. The obligation upon which she sues
has been paid and discharged, and it does not avail her to say
that such payment and discharge were in pursuance of an
agreement which was in fact illegal. It has nevertheless been
paid and discharged, and the law will not, at her instance,
either directly or indirectly, set aside or undo what has been
done, on account of any illegality in the agreement.
It is also claimed by the plaintiff, that from the relation
existing between Mr. and Mrs. Tallinger, it must be presumed
that she was overreached, imposed upon, or defrauded by her
.husband; but all the facts appear here, and there is nothing
from which such a presumption can arise. At the time of the
execution of the obligation of February 18, 1881, Mr. Tallinger was about 72 years old, and it was impossible on the
2oth of July thereafter to estimate precisely the value of that
obligation. It was conditioned upon performance of several
things by the plaintiff Its value depended, to a large extent,
upon the length of the testator's life, and of the adequacy of
his property at death. Under such circumstances, it is not
apparent that $5,oo in hand paid, was not a fair equivalent
for the release of the obligation. There is no allegation in
the complaint, that she was overreached or defrauded, or that
the amount paid her was not adequate. But, even if the
.plaintiff had been overreached by being induced to surrender
the prior obligation, and to take in lieu thereof $5,000 in
money, she was in no condition to succeed in this action. The
defendants did not admit the liability of the testator upon the
obligation of February 18th, but disputed it, and alleged that
she had violated the conditions mentioned therein, and that
she was not, therefore, entitled to recover anything. Under
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such circumstances, before she could recover upon the original instrument, she should have repudiated the subsequent
agreement of July 2oth, and should have tendered back the
$5,000. It is not a case where, upon the undisputed facts, the
plaintiff would be entitled to recover something, either under
the original obligation or the substituted agreement. The
executors denied their obligation to pay anything, and in such
a case it was the duty of the plaintiff to restore the $5,ooo,
that the litigation could thereafter be carried on solely upon
the liability of the defendants under the original agreement:
Gozddv. Bank (i881), 86 N. Y. 75.
The judgment should therefore be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
An agreement for separation, made
by a husband and a wife while they are
living together, and to take place presently, has, in some instances, been held
to be valid, but where it is made to
take place in the future, it is such as
the court will not uphold, because contrary to public policy.
[" Contracts of this description have
been long sanctioned in England, owing, probably, to the circumstances that
absolute divorces are not permitted for
causes arising subsequent to the marriage. But, in this State, such liberal
provision is made by law, for divorces,
-that necessity does not require, and
policy does not admit, a separation by
private agreement:" Svil-r, J., dissenting, X\ichols v. Palmer (ISi), 5 Day
(Conn.) 58. Still, itwas soon said that,
"although the wisest judges have frequently asserted that deeds of separation are at variance with the policy of
law, it is now too firmly settled to be
shaken :" RoGERs, J., flutton v. Duey
(1846), 3 Pa. 1oi, 1o4.
Recog-nize'd in U. S. as valid.
[The Supreme Court of California, in
1858, felt justified in saying that, "by
the settled law of the Unhed States

such agreements are not invalid because
against sound principles of policy, and
are upheld and enforced when entered
imto through the intervention of a trustee, if followed by immediate separation,
or if separation has previously taken
place :" FIELD, J.,Wells v. Stout, 9
Cal. 479, 494.
[Such is still the law: Walker v.
Walker(x869), 76 U. S. (9Wall.) 743.
[California Civil Code (chap. 3, ed.
IS85,p. 44,) provides-" 159. A husband and wife cannot, by any contract
with each other, alter their legal relations, except, as to property, and except
that they may agree, in writing, to an
immediate separation, and may make
provision for the support of either of
them, and of their children, during such
Separation, under this
separation."
section, ends the immediate family relationship: In re Noah, S. CL Cal.,
Oct. 24, 1887.
5 Day
Aichols v. Palmer (I8),
(Conn.) 47; Goodwin v. Goodin
(1810), 4 Id. 345, 351, 353, 354Chapman v. Gray(1850), 8 Ga. 341;
A.fcLaren v. Bradford (1874), 52 Id.
648.
Phillips v. Afeyers (876). 82 Ill. 67.
Reed v. Beazley (1820), I Blackford
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(Ind.) 97; Dutton v. Dutton (1868),

Y.) 5oo; Beach v. Beach (1842), 2 Hill
(Id.) 26o; Anderson v. Anderson
(1832), I Edw. Chan. (N. Y.) 380;
Mrightv. Miller (1843), 1 Sandf.
Chan. (Id.) ao3; Morgan v. Potter
(1879), 17 Hun. (Id.) 403; Afercein
v. People (1840), 25 Wend. (Id.) 64,
son (1868),25 Id. 350; Lintonv. Crosby 97; Shelthar v. Gregory (1829), 2 Id.
(1880), 54 Id. 478,481; Goddardv. 422; Grijfin v. Banks (x868), 37 N.
Beebe (1853), 4 Greene (Iowa) 126,
Y. 621; Dupre v. Rein (1878), 56
following Read v. Beazly (1820), r
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 228; Mann v. RulBlackford (Ind.) 97.
bert (z885), 38 Hun (Id.) 27; Allen v.
Gaines v. Poor (1861), 3 Met. (Ky.)
4ffeek (1882), 64 How. Pr. (Id.) 380.
503; Loud v. Loud (1868), 4 Bush
[Garverv.Miller (1866), 16 Ohio
(Id.) 457; Simpson v. Simpson (1836),
St. 527; hnomas v. Broun (1859), 10
4 Dana (Id.) i4o.
Id. 247; Bettle v. Wilson (x846), 14
.Kremelberg v. Alremelberg (1879) 52
Ohio 257.
Md. 553, 563; Lippy v. Masonheiner
Hutton v. Duey (1846), 3 Pa. 100;
(1856), 9 Id. 310; MeCubbin v. Pat- Dillinger's App. (186o), 35 Id. 357;
..
terson (186o), I6 Id. 179; Schindelv. Hintner'sApp. (1867), 54 Id. 1zo; AgSchindel (1858), 12 Id. 294; Helms v.
new's App., S. Ct. Pa., Jan'y 23, 1888;
Frandscus(1828), 2 Bland Chan. (Md.)
Smith v. Anowles (185 3 ), 2 Grant (Pa.)
544, 565; Brown v. Brown (1847), 5 413; Walsh v. Aly(1859),
3 4 Pa.84.
Gill (ld.) 249, 254 (explained in J. G.
[North Carolina denies the validity
v. H. G. (1870), 33 Md. 408); Wal- of contracts for separation: Collins v.
lingsford v. Wallingsford (1825), 6 H.
Collins (z867), 1 Phillips Eq. 155.
& J. (Id.) 485, 489.
[" It is to be considered for the first
Fox v. Davis (1873), iI 3 Mass. 255;
time, whether a deed of separation bePage v. Trufant (i8o6), 2 Id. i59;
tween husband and wife will be enAlbee v. Wyman (1857), 76 Id. 222;
forced in this court. * * * It is to be
Chapin v. Chapin (1883), 135 Id. 393;
admitted that in some of the old govAlley v. Winn (1883), 134 Id. 77.
ernments, passions and vices have fixed
Randallv.Randall(1877), 37 Mich.
this evil upon society. It was unknown
563.
to the common law. * * * * If there
StePhenson v. Osborne (1866), 41 were any doubt as to our policy, it
Miss. 119; Garlandv.Garland (1874),
would seem to be clearly settled by our
50 Id. 694, 716; House v. Harden
legislation. Important as the relation
(1875), 52 Id. 860, 874.
is, our whole legislation is comprised in
Garbut v. Bowling (1883), 8I Mo.
a few pages of the Revised Code. It
214.
provides that marriage shall be indisSales v. Sales (1850), 21 N. H. 312.
soluble, except for impotency at the
Dixon v. Dixon (1873), 23 N. J.
time of marriage, or subsequent infiEq. 316.
delity. It allows separation only when
[Carsonv. Murray (1832), 3 Paige's
the wife's condition is intolerable, or life
Chan. (N. Y.) 483; Pdtit v. Pettit burdensome. And it allows
separate
(1887), 107 N. Y. 677; CroPsey v.
support only where the husband is a
McKinney (1859), 30 Barb. (N.Y.) 47;
drunkard or a spendthrift, and is wastCalkins v. Long (1855), 22 Id. 103;
ing his substance to the impoverishment
Clarkv.Fosdick(z886), 13 Daly (N.
of his family. And in all these cases
30 Ind. 452.
Ready. Howe (1862), 13 Iowa 50;
MeA'ee v. Reynolds (1869) 26 Id. 578;
following the doctrine of Hutton v.
Duey (1846),3 Pa. zoo; Blake v. Blake
(1858), 7 Iowa 46; Robertson v. Robert-
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the parties are not allowed to be the
judges; but they must make application
to court, and, so far from their consent
availing anything, there must be satisfactory proof that there has been no
collusion or concert; and if for divorce,
that it is not for the mere purpose of
being freed and separated from each
other-observe, separated from each
other:" RF.ADE, J., Id. 158. This doctrine has been strongly approved, as
what ought lo be the pronounced
American doctrine, by Schouler, Dom.
Rel., 217.
[The Supreme Court of that State
has, however, lately said-" It may admit of question, in view of subsequent
changes in the law of marriage, in respect to the property rights of the woman, whether the proposition "-that
deeds of separation are against law and
public policy, and will not be enforced,
(Collins v. Collins, supra)-"in its unlimited extent, can now be upheld. A
voluntary separation, under some circumstances, is recognized as a legal
condition, out of which may arise certain powers to be exerci-ed over her
estate :" SMrIH, C. J. Sparks v. Sparks
(1886), 94 N. C. 527,53I. The learned
judge after quoting the Code ( 8310"Every woman, who shall be living
separate from her husband, either under
a judgment of divorce, by a competent
Court, or under a deed of separation,
executed by said husband and wife,
and registered in the county in which
she resides," shall have the effect of
making her a free trader, added-" This
act of legislation, passed in February,
1872, in furtherance of the constitutional
provision, by which the property of
the wonian, on her marriage, is secured to her as separate estate, implies a possible legal separation of
the parties, by voluntary agreements,
and defines her condition and rights
resulting therefrom. If such a case
can exist, and be upheld by law, the
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facts of that before us, would be one:"
Id. 532.

Collins v. Collins was not ex-

plicitly overruled, how~ever: "The decision in the case referred to, is in general
terms, that such contracts, merely as
such, :xave no binding obligation which
will be enforced, because public policy
favors the preservation of the nuptial
tie, and is opposed to any arrangement
between the parties, by which its resultant duties are evaded. But the principle
is, that such an agreement will not be
enforced, at the instance of either party;
not that what may have been done in
carrying out its purpose will be undone
by the Court. It will not assist, when
its aid is asked, or, in the words of the
Court, its provisions ' will not be enforced
in this Court '-a Court exercising equitable functions: Id. 532. So the wife
was refused relief from a conveyance
made by her, in pursuance of the marriage settlement.
[Buckner v. Ruth (I861), 13 Rich.

(S. C.) 157.
Goodrich v. Bryant (1858), 5 Sneed
(Tenn.) 325 ; Keys v. A-eys (1872), I
Ileisk. (Id.) 425 ; McAllister v. .MeA1lister (1872), IO Id. 345. Parhamn v.
Parhan (1845), 6 Hump. (Id.) 296 is
to the contrary and has no supporting
authority: WILLIAMS, C. J. Loud v.
Loud (1868), 4 Bush. (Ky.) 459-60.
W'alker v. Stringellow (1868), 30
Texas 570.

Squires v. Squires (1880), 53 Vt. 21 r.
[Switzer v. S-witzer 1875), 26 Gratt.
(Va.)
574; Iearsberger v. Alger
(1878), 31 Id. 52; though these cases
do not fairly decide the question, the
the court merely admitting the weight
of authority to be in favor of the validity of deeds of separation: 31 Id. 61.
-4comnon law doctrine.
[" The doctrine of separate maintenance, by aid of a trustee, is found in
the earliest records of English jurisprudence. Such contracts have, for ages,
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been protected and enforced in their
courts of chancery : and when collaterally brought to view in courts of law,
have been recognizea as the basis of
legal adjudications. So far have the
courts in Engiand,from questioning the
efficacy of such agreements to support
a contract for maintenance, that a very
different question has agitated them in
modem times, viz., the capacity of the
wife during such separation: BALDWIN,
J., Alichols v. Palmer (181I), 5 Day
(Conn.) 51.
[The general principle was declared
by Chancellor WALWVORTH to be that
"it is impossible for a feme covert to
make any valid agreement with her
husband, to live separate from him, in
violation of the marriage contract, and
of the duties which she owes to society,
except under the sancti6n of the court;
and in a case where the conduct of her
husband has been such as to entitle her
to a decree for a separation. The law
of the land does not authorize, or sanction, a voluntary agreement for separation between husband and wife. It
merely tolerates such agreements, when
made in such a manner that they can
be enforced by, or against, a third person, acting in behalf of the wife:"
Rogers v. Rogers (1834), 4 Paige Chan.
(N. Y.) 516, 517; and, again, that "it
may well be doubted, whether public
policy does not forbid any agreement
fur a separation between husband and
wife, except under the sanction of a
court of justice; and whether it does
not also require that such agreements
should be limited to those cases where,
by previous misconduct of one of the
parties, the other is entitled to have the
marriage contract dissolved, either
wholly or partially, by a decree of the
competent tribunal :" Carson v. Afurray (1832), 3 Paige Chan. (N. Y.)
483, 500.
[From another point of view, it was
said that equity would never decree a

separation, "e v en when husband and
wife have stipulated for it 1 in the nost
formal and solemn instruments, whether
they be executory, as articles of agreement, ox complete, as by deed : WForral
v.Jacob (1817), 3 Mer. 268; Legardv.
Jhnson (797), 3 Vesey Jr. 352; Ifead
v. IAkad(x 747),3 Atkyns 550; XkcAen-

nan v. Phillis (1828), 6 Whar. (Pa.)
576. W en the parties have ected the
separation, equity will control its incidents and accomplish its lawful objects;
it will compel the husband to pay what
he stipulated to pay for the maintenance
of the wife, and the trustee to perform his
duties faithfully, but it will not decree
aseparation. It is impossible that equity
should engage in the work of putting
asunder those whom God has joined
together. In England this is said to be
from deference to the ecclesiastical
courts, who tolerate no voluntary separation of husband and wife; but the
true ground of the rule is to be found, I
apprehend, in the sacredness of the
marriage bond, and the marital rights
of the husband at common law :"
WOODWARD,

J., Smtith

(1853), 2 Grant (Pa.) 415.

v.

Knrwles

]

S,'paration essential.

A contract for separation, to be effectual, must be entered into at a time
-when the husband and wife are living separate, or must be followed
by a separation in pursuance of such
agreement:

Carson v. Murray (1832),

3 Paige Chan. (N. Y.)

483, 501;

A1"agee. v. ilagee (1874), 67 Barb. (N.
Y-) 487, 490. (" The great weight of

authority sustains the validity of such
contracts where the separation has taken
place, or is to take place immediately.
But where the agreement is made in
contemplation of future separation, the
current of authority is against its validity. In this case, the bill" filed by the
trustee "recites that the parties have
lived separately since the agreement :"
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ENDICOTT J., Fox v. DaVis (1873), 113
Mas. 257.
Where tlte parties are living together,
an agreement for the future separation
of lithuandl and wife, i, void, although
entered into through the intervention of
atrustee: Ml,.re-ein v. The I'eople(1840),
25 Wend. (N. V.), 64, 77; Cars-ol v.
lurrtiv and R,,grs v. RoSers,supra.

[It seems that this is a con!.equence
of the principle that cohabitation rescinds a contract of separation: per
BRADY, J., Gould v. Gould k1805), 29
How. (N. V.) I'r. 441, 458.
Consideration.
Where the separation already existz
and is not produced by the agreement,
the contract is valid, and the consideration of the'husband's agreement to pay
the sun of money to his wife, as agreed
in the contract, is his release from lialility for the support of his wife: FItciF,
j., Peatit v. Pittlt (1887), 107 N. Y.
679, citing Cdkins v. Lng (x85 5 ), 22
Barb. 97; .1, an v. .11abert(I8S5), 38

Hun 27; and Caripentr v. Osborn
kISS6), 102 N. Y. 552.
[An actual consideration is of importance, for R.xD, J., remarked, in affirming a judgment for dower, in spite of an
agreement without any real consideration, "she got nothing from him except
the child which she raised:" It dsh v.
34 Pa. 85.
A,./y (1859),
[The question of a consideration is
important when there are creditors of
the husband: Gr-ffin v. Banks (1868),
37 N. Y, 621. In such case, the mere
release by the husband, of his property
to his wife, without a covenant by a
competent third party as trustee, that
the husband shall not be chargeable
with the vife's maintenance, will be
without consideration and void at law,
and, as to subseqaent creditors of the
husband, void in equity also: Cropsey
Y. fcA'inne; (I859), 3o Barb. (N. Y.)
47; Beach v. Beach (1842), 2 Hill
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(Id.) 26o. In this respect, agreements
for separation are not different from
other post-nuptial agreements between
huband and wife.
[If the consideration of the deed is
really the obtaining a divorce, and the
deed is not designed to secure to the
wife, either her property, or maintenance, the deed will transgress the provisions of the divorce statutes, forbid(ling collusion. Th~e length of this note
forbids more than a reference to Speek
v. Dansaan (1879), 7 Mo. App. 165;
S,i',Iing v.Doe//ner (188I), 1O Id.
373 ; PhillipAs V. Thorp (1882), 1o Ore.
494; Cross v. Cross (18 78), 58 N. H.
373; Aa/bu'n v. Field eS 75 ), 78 Pa.
194.
[W-hile payment of the consideration
cannot be compelled by the court, in
case of agreements without a trustee,
actual payment will be recognized, and
the party paid will be held estopped to
make any claim against the provisions
of the deed, except upon the ground of
fraud, deception, or oppression: AcKee
v. leRynohs (I869), 26 Icwa 589; Robn v.R'ob'rtson (i868), 25 Id. 350.
erls,
[The inducing cause of the separation is immaterial: Gould v. Gould
(1865), 29 ItoW. (N. Y.), Pr.441,458;
(Carsonv. Murrayand Rogersv. Rogers,
supra.
[See also under .Efectofasubsequent
,vorce, infra.
.A.ect ,freunion.
[Recision of the contract will be
presumed, if the parties afterwards cohabit, as husband and wife, by mutual
consent, for ever so short a time: WALWORTII, Chan., Carson v. Mlurray
(1832), 3 Paige Chan. (N.Y.), 483,501;
Sheltharv. Gregory (1829), 2 Vend.
(N.Y.) 422.
[But where the cohabitation was for
a single night only, and inferably, from
lack of opposing evidence, that this was
with the wife's consent, the Court held
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the contract to continite in force. It
contained an express covenaht that the
husband should not visit his wife, without her consent. Contention was made
that this solitary visit amounted to a
reconciliation and abrogated the deed.
"The conduct of the parties shows
clearly there was no reconciliation, and
no determination, or wish, or desire, to
live together again as man and wife.
The wife acted under the deed of separation, and has always receivedthe income of the real estate, and all the personal estate, up to the present time.
The theory of reconciliation, waiver, or
abandonment, would have invalidated
this deed, tut she has never evinced
any wish, or intention, to act upon this
view" of the question. So, after seeing
her husband but three or four tims in
two years, she never sees him again at
all, during the year he died. She believed the separation was complete and
the deed inviolate, and it is clear the
testator so thought and acted. The acts
of both parties showed that they both
believed they were as completely separated as two persons could be, who
were still in strict law, man and wife :"
Hitner'sAp. (x867), 54 Pa.
READ, J.,
iio, 116.
(A stipulation in the articles of separation, that the parties might visit each
other, by mutual consent, in times of
sickness, will not vitiate the agreement,
until acted upon by actual cohabitation;
in the latter case, even a stipulation that
the deed should not thereby be annulled will not be effective to keep the
separation valid: WALNVORTH, Chan.,
Carson v. Murray (1832), 3 Paige
Chan. (N. Y.), 483, 502; 2 Story, Eq.
1428; Chapnan v. Gray
Jurisp.,
(z850), 8 Ga. 349, per LUMPKIN, J.
[But this avoidance of the deed of
separation, is not to be understood to
apply to a separate maintenance, stipulated to continue if the parties should
come together again: Walker v. Wal-

ker (1869), 76 U. S. (9 Wall.), 743,
752. "It was the intention of the parties that the arrangement should be permanent, and to accomplish that purpose, the agreement was framed so that
the wife should enjoy her separate estate during life, although she should
subsequently become reconciled to her
husband, and cohabit with him. We
can see no valid objection to such a provision, and it is certainly supported by
authority ( Wilson v. Alushett (1832), 3
Barn. & Ad. 743; Bell, Husb. and WI.,
525-41). The husband had a right to
make a settlement upon his wife, without any view of to separation, and the
insertion of this provision shows that
he did not intend the settlement to cease
on the return of the wife to cohabitation :" DAvis, J., Id.
Effect of a subseqtuent divorce.
[" What is the effect of a divorce for
the wife's adultery, which was known
to the husband at the time of the execution of the deed, upon such a covenant?
It cannot be unlawful for a husband to
provide by deed for the support of an
erring wife; and if he should subsequently obtain a divorce for adultery, of
which he was aware at the time he made
the covenant, and the wife has done
nothing to forfeit her rights under the
covenant, we see no good reason why
the divorce should discharge the husband from the obligation he has thus
voluntarily assumed. * * * * There is
no proof, nor is there any intimation,
that the wife has been guilty of a repetition of the offence which has been the
source of all this trouble. And although
the deed of separation does not operate
as a bar to the application for divorce,
we see no inconsistency in granting a
divorce, and, at the same time, refuse
to release the husband from a covenant
providing for the support of his wife. *
* ** The fact is, at the time the covenant was made, the parties only con-
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templated living apart, and did not
therefore make any provision upon the
contingency of a divorce:" RoBNsoN,
J., A-remelbrg v. A'remelbheg (1879),
5z Md. 553,563,564. Here,the Court
pQint out that the case of Charlesworth
v. flat (I873), 29 L. T. R. (N. S.) 647 ;
-22 .R94; 431L. J.Exch. 25; 91L.
R. Exch. 38, went much further, as the
adultery there had occurred after the
deed: the husband was held to his
covenants, after obtaining a divorce on
that ground. To the same effect: Dixon
v. Dixon (1873), 23 N. J. Eq. 316;
s.c. 24 Id. 133; Lister v. Lister (1882),
35 Id. 49, 57.
[The courts go further and sustain
the covenants, even though the wife
should remarry after a divorce, subsequent to their execution: Blaker v.
CooPer (1822), 7 S. & R. (Pa.) 500.
TIL;HMAN, C. J.,pointed out that the
release of dower "was an important
consideration. He retains all the benefit
of this agreement, notwithstanding the
subsequent divorce and marriage of his
wife. It does not appear on the record,
at whobe instance this divorce was obtained, not what was the cause of it. It
may be that it was caused by the husband's misconduct, and if so, it would
be a bad reason for getting rid of the
annuity. I will not presume that it was
occasioned by the misconduct of the
wife, because it is not shown. There is
no doubt that a man may agree to pay
an annuity to his wife during his life,
whether she remains his wife, or obtains
a divorce and marries again; and it appears to me that, in the present case,
there has been such an agreement :" Id.
p. 502. This was accepted as good law
by the Court of Appeals of New York,
in Carpenter v. Osborn (1886), io2 N.
Y. 552, 560.
[Where the wife sued for maintenance and the husband agreed to pay a
sum of money, if the wife would give
a bond with surety, to release all claims

upon him and upon his estate, and this
was done; the bond was held to be
valid, as not against public policy, and
the surety compelled to reimburse the
husband for moneys which he had paid
under the stress of an order of court,
which was afterwards reversed: Winn
v. Sanford, S. Ct. Jud. Ct. Mass., Nov.
28, x888.]
A trustee is necessary.
[The trustee for the wife is an essential party to all contracts, unless there is
some statutory exception : Rogers v.
Rogers (834), 4 Paige Chan. (N. Y.)
516. This will be apparent after reflection upon the common law principles, which identify the husband and
wife. "It follows from these principles
that the wife will have no separate interest in the propertyput into the hands
of a trustee for her support, and that
she can have no remedy, in a court of
chancery, to call the trustee to account;
but if the trustee is guilty of a breach
of trust, he must be liable to the husband, for a violation of his contract, and
to him, or his representatives, only. It
will follow also, that the wife may re-*
turn to her husband, whenever she
chooses, and he will be as much obliged
to afford her protection and support, as
though no such agreement had been
made, and her right of dower, in case
she survives her husband, will remain
altogether unimpaired :" SMITH, J.,
Xichols v. Palmer (x8xs), 5 Day
(Conn.) 57.
[The great necessity for a trustee is
seen to arise, first, from the principles
that neither husband nor wife may release their marital rights of curtesy, or
dower, except to a third person, and not
then if designed to separate such inchoate estate from the title in fee: DILLON,
C. J., Mcee v. Reynolds (x869), 26
Iowa 582-9. And, second, from another
principle, that actions between the husband and wife, for violations of the
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agreement of separation, require a trustee to represent the wife: Simpson v.
Sinpson (1836), 4 Dana (Ky.) 140.
[Hence, where the trustee declined
to act, the deed was held to be void:
Smith v. Knowles (1853), 2 Grant
(Pa.) 413.
Exce.ptions to necessio,for a trustee.

[The necessity for a trustee was not
recognized, where the deed was made
directly between the parties, and its
validity was not drawn into question
until after the husband's death; the
wife was then not allowed to violate the
agreement and claim her dower or
thirds, the Court saying--" At law, no
contract can be made between husband
and wile, without the intervention of
trustees ; for she is considered as being
subpostestateviri,and incapable of con-

tracting with him. Bnt in equity, when
the contract is reasonable, and when it
has been consummated, it will be upheld :" ROGERS, J.,Hutton v.%.Duey
(1846), 3 Pa. 101, 105.
[This case is said to be not in harmony with the general current of
authorities, and is at variance with
the former rulings of this court, in
the cases already cited:

ELLETT, J.,

Stephenson v. Osborne (1866), 41 Miss.
126, citing Carterv. Carter (85o), 14
S. & M. (Miss.) 59 (which rests upon
the authority of Clancey, Hus. & Wf.
392, and Kent, Comm. 176), and Mills
v. Richards (1857), 34 Miss. 77 (where
a deed was made directly between husband and wife).
[The law of iutton v. Duey was afterwards affirmed in Dillinger'sAppeal
(186o), 35 Pa. 357, and is still good
law, notwithstanding the criticism of
EL.ETT, J., supra.
[" Usually such agreements are entered into by means of trustees, but
equity, which is not strenuous of forms,
does not necessarily require this for-

a[.

nmlity :" DmLOX,C. .,OkIA 'ev. Reynolds (1869), 26 Iowa 588, citing Bons/ait.gh v. Bons."augh (1828), 17 S. & R.

(Pa.) 361.

This cited case was an ac-

tion of ejectment, in which the question

of title depended upon a deed of separation made directly between husband
and wife, and in which the husband relinquished all claim on real estate conveyed to his wife and the heirs of her
body and their heirs, by his father-in-law.
The parties had notoriously lived apart
for some years, when a creditor of the
husband seized the husband's interest
and sold it at sheriff's sale. The sheriff's
vendee failed to recover the land.
[On the other hand, the absence of a
trustee, in cases where the wife is not
enabled to convey her real estate-without her husband, effectually prevents
her alienation without the joinder of the
husband in the deed: Lipy v. Masonheimer (1856), 9 Md. 310.
[Of course, there is in general no necessity for a trustee in States where the
rights, powers and obligations of married women are greatly enlarged; especially where a married woman may
convey her interest in real estate, in the
same manner as other persons: Robertson v. Robertson (1868), 25 Iowa 350,
354, 355. (But see, infra.)
[In Iowa, the case cited was nullified
by Section 2203 of the Code, (ed. i888,
p. 8oi)-" When property is owned by
eitherhusband or wife, the other has no
interest therein which can be the subject
of contract between them, or such interest as will make the same liable for
the contracts or liabilities of either the
husband or wife who is not the owner
of the property, except as provided in
this chapter"
Hence, a deed of separation, in which the wife released her
dower right, was held inoperative to
prevent her from having her dower
admeasured, after the husband's death:
Linton v. Crosby (1880), 54 Iowa 478.
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what jealous of the influence which it
is commonly in the power of the husband to exert in their procurement, however that influence may arise-whether
from her lingering fondness and habitual
deferen, e, the restraint of his presence,
his superior knowledge of business and
values, or his powers of coercion and
annoyance. Hence, it is an essential
element of the proposition above stated,
that the terms of the contract in favor of
the wife, ball be fair, reasonable and
ju-t to her, in view of all the circumstances of the case and of the parties at
the time the contract is made :" Ga;-zer,
Lrr of liller-, v. Adliller (1866), 16
()ibio 527, 531.
[I fence, in Virginia, the Circuit Court
set aside a deed of separation, because
"it does not clearly appear that, in the
[i'en set ashile.
negotiation which preceded the agree[In Ohio, a trustee was held to be ment, as well as at the time of executing
the same, the wife was in a position in
unnece--ary, if the Court were satisfied
which she could act, and did act, not
of the fairne-i of the provi~ion for the
only with perfect freedom, but with
wife. In that case, the widow claimed
knowledge and appreciation of all the
again-t the hu-band's estate; BRINKERcircumstances of her situation and of her
po-ta
parol
"That
said:
J.,
io10F,
individual and marital rights; and that
nuptial agreement madie between husthe contract in itself was fair and just,
band and wife, in view of a voluntary
wholly free from exceptions, and such
separation, and fully executed on the
as a court of equity itself might have
for
a
conwherely.,
part of the libuand,
impoed upon the parties, in a case in
sideration, -\ hih, in the light of all the
which tlir persons and their property
circumtancet of the parties at the time
had properly fallen under its jurisdiction
the contract i5 made, i, fair, reasonable
and control." And this was affirmed
claim
all
relinquishes
wife
the
just,
and
by the Court of Appeals: Svi.zer v.
to a di-tril ut ve share of the huland's
Swt/z,'r (I75), 26 Grat. (Va.) 574,
him,
survive
she
case
in
personal estate,
582.
will be upheld and enforced in equity,
[Where the wife seeks to have the
and that the intervention of a trustee is
deed set aside, on the grounds of fraud,
unnecessary, are propositions now too
duress, and inequality, and fails, the
firmly settled to require the citation of
Court cannot do .more than dismiss the
many authorities for their support. I
bill; a decree, that the deed remain in
therefore content myself with citing the
full force and effect, requires a proper
v. Proun (I859), tO
cases of Tcn.zt
cross-bill: Borck,zn's AP., S. Ct.
lou9/"on
v.
Ilcu,0hton
247;
Ohio
'11i/onz 1'euna., May 24, iSS6.
vds,,n'v.
({S60), 14 Inth 505;
(1848, 1 II. I.. Ca. 53S, and Di/lingReseission. ,
er's Ap . (ISo), 35 Pa. 357. But, in
[The wife may rescind the deed by
respect to contracts of this, and of a
accepting other proviions;
voluntarily
kindred kind, equity is properly some-

Trust b iml/icati,,n.
[There may 1e a tru-tee by the legal
effect of the deed of separation.
Thu,, in ("z;k v. "; ,! k (1SS6), 1.
Daly, N. Y. i 5oo, the .C'urt of Common
I'leas of New York City were a.,ked to
declare as void an agreement of separation Letween busband and wife, as principal%, and two others as sureties. The
husband covenanted with the wife and
the suretie-, to pay a yearly sun, and
also covenanted with the sureties to perform his covenants. The sureties al-o
covenanted to indemnifv the husband
against hi, wife's future obligations. The
sureties were htld to be trustees, and
the agreement declarcd to be valid. To
L)upre v. Rein (IS7S),
the same ehu,,
56 flow. (N. Y.) Prac. 22S.
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she will not be allowed, at some other
time, to revive the covenants of the
deed: Albee v. Wynan (1857), 76
Mass. 222.
F'ai6erto the .Deed.
[The wife must sign the deed; she
cannot act by attorney, even in an agreement filed of record in a suit for alimony
and intended to amicably terminate such
suit: Walligsford v. Wallingsford

(1825), 6 H. & J. (Md.) 485. Here
the agreement was at the foot of the
husband's answer.
[In Vermont, the wife's father was
permitted to sign the deed of separation,
as the wife's agent. The separation had
already occurred, and the father was
treated as her trustee, and the deed held
to he valid, as though she had signed it
in fact: Squires v. Squires (1880), 53
Vt. 208.
JAs. M. KERL.

Sureme Court of Wisconsin.
SOQUET v. THE STATE.
The testimony of a medical witness is, at best, hearsay, and inadmissible in a
criminal trial for murder by poison, when the witness has had no practical experience in the treatment of cases of this character, and can testify only from memory,
what medical works and instructors teach on the subject.
Boye v. The State (1883), 57 Wis. 472, approved and followed, as supported
equally by reason and authority.

Error to"the Circuit Court of Brown County.
John P. Soquet was indicted for and convicted of murder in
the first degree, and brings error.
Htudd & Wgman, for plaintiff in error.
C. E. Vroman and Assistant Attorney-General L. K. Luse,
for the State.
ORTON, J. (November 8, 1888). The information charged the
plaintiff in error with having murdered his wife, Esperance
Soquet, on the I 3 th day of June, 1873, by poisoning, and the
trial was had in April, 1888. The evidence tended to prove
the following facts: The plaintiff in error and one August
Mainsort, in June, 1873, lived as neighbors on farms one mile
apart. The family of the plaintiff in error consisted of himself and his wife, Esperance, and seven children, and that of
Mainsort consisted only of himself and wife; and a criminal
intimacy appeared to exist between the plaintiff in error and
the wife of Mainsort: Mainsort suddenly died, and, on autopsy, eight grains of arsenic were found in his stomach, and
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the plaintiff in error was present, with his wife, at his death,
and superintended and took great interest in his speedy interment. In about ten days afterwards, Esperance, the wife of
the plaintiff in error, died, and a short time after that event the
plaintiff in error married the widow of Mainsort. Esperance
Soquet was a strong and healthy woman, and had borne eight
children without unusual trouble. She was confined and
brought forth a child on Monday morning under normal conditions, and passed through it safely. Dr. Munro, of Green
Bay, was her attending physician, and he testified substantially
that there was no indication of disease resulting from her
confinement; but, that on Tuesday or Wednesday following, a
great change had taken place in her condition, and she was
very sick, and many things present, together with her symptoms, excited his suspicion that she had been poisoned with
arsenic, and he made a diagnosis of her case sufficient to satisfy himself that she was suffering from some corrosive poison;
and he made examination of the cooking utensils and other
things for traces of poison, but found nothing. He then declined to treat her any further. In a very few days thereafter
she died, and no autopsy was ever made to ascertain the cause
of her death. Very soon after her death, her body became
black, and much discolored. The plaintiff in error had been
seen to give her mush, and to carry out of the room what was
left of it, and to carry away the contents of her stomach by
vomiting. The evidence, aside from these conditions observed
by Dr. Munro and others, and from certain statements or admissions of the plaintiff in error, was circumstantial, and none
of such admissions amounted to direct confessions. Over
fourteen years had passed since the occurrence, and the events
of that time, and such statements, or many of them, depended
upon the memory of witnesses. The trial resulted in a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and the plaintiff in
error was sentenced to imprisonment for life.
The exceptions taken in behalf of the defendant, at the trial,
are very numerous. But inasmuch as there may be no occasion for the same exceptions on another trial, we shall consider
only such as are the most important and material, and upon
which we are compelled to reverse the judgment of conviction.
VOL. XXXVII.- 3 1
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The witness, Dr. Munro, made about the only diagnosis of
the fatal sickness of the deceased; and he stated to the jury
the various symptoms that came under his observation, and
other witnesses testified to other symptoms and appearances.
This witness having detailed the symptoms he had himself observed, was asked by the District Attorney, "What are the
symptoms of arsenical poisoning?" Objection was made by
the counsel for the prisoner that the witness was not shown to
be an expert. The Court sustained the objection, until the witness could be further examined as to hi' qualifications to testify
as an expert. He was thereupon asked, "Are you a member
of any medical society?" and the witness answered, "Yes.'
He was further asked, "Graduate of any medical college ?"
and he answered, "No." He was then asked, "What medical
society are you a member of?" and he answered, "Brown
County." He was asked, "How long have you been a member of that society?" and he answered, "Ten or twelve
years." He was then asked, "How long has your practice as
a physician covered?" and he answered, "Twenty-five or
thirty years." He was then asked, " Has it covered cases of
poisoning?" and he answered, "Not that I remember just
now." He was then asked, "Have you made a study of that
branch of practice as well as other branches, and in the same
way ?" and he answered, "Just in the same way, yes." He
was then asked, "State whether a knowledge of poisons and
their effects is a part of the knowledge of a physician practicing ?" and he answered, "It certainly is." He was then
asked, "You may state what are the symptoms of arsenical
poisoning ?" This question was again objected to by the counsel of the prisoner, as the witness had not shown himself qualified, and the objection was ovefruled, and the counsel of the
prisoner excepted to such ruling. The witness thereupon answered, stating the symptoms and appearances he had observed
in the sickness of the diseased, and testified to by others, as
the symptoms of arsenical poisoning. He was then asked,
"What a livid appearance of the face indicated ?" This question was also objected to, and the objection overruled, and exception taken. The witness answered, "An unhealthy circulation of the blood, for one thing." He was then asked, "In
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connection with the symptoms you have described, what would
it indicate, if anything ? '" The question was also objected to,
and the objection was overruled, and exception taken. The
witness answered, "Well, it would just indicate that the whole
circulative system was suffering from something unknown, and
possibly what I was suspecting;" and, under the same objection, lie testified that certain appearances he had described, indicated arsenical poisoning, or other poisoning. - On cross-examination, the witness, when asked, "Have you had a case of
arsenical poisoning to treat yourself, individually, as a physician ?" answered, "No; " and when asked, " Have you ever
seen a person die, when you knew that he died from the effects
of irritant poisoning-present at his death ?" answered, "No ;"
and when asked, "Then all you know about what the symptoms of arsenical or irritant poisoning may be, is -from theory,
from your knowledge as a student of medicine ?" answered,
"And from books;" and when further asked, "And from
reading scientific works upon that question?" answered,
"Yes;" and when asked further, "Not from any practical observation of your own'?" answered, "No."
Dr. Olmstead, offered as another medical witness and expert,
by the District Attorney, testified that he was a physician, and
had been a practicing physician a little over thirteen years,
and had been in practice all of the time, and was still practicing, and was then asked by the District Attorney, "Are you
a member of any association ? " and he answered, " Yes; a
medical association; the Homoeopathic State Society of Wisconsin." He was then asked, " Has your practice covered
cases of poisoning at all ?" and he answered, "I never had a
case of it." He was then asked, "Has your course of study
and investigation carried you into the examination of symptoms of poisoning, and the effects of poison ?" He answered,
"Yes."
He then testified that he had heard most of the testimony of Dr. Munro. An hypothetical question, claimed by
the District Attorney to contain and embrace all the symptoms
testified to by Dr. Munro, and other witnesses, and concluded
with the questions: "What would you say was the matter with
the patient?" and "What would be your diagnosis of the
This was objected to by the counsel of the prisoner
case?"
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and the objection was overruled and exception taken, and the
witness answered, "I should suspect that an irritant poison
had been administered." He was then asked, "What irritant
poison ?" and he answered, "Arsenic."
He was then asked,
" Well, from the symptoms, as I have stated them, as compared
with cholera niorbus, which would you say the 'patient was
suffering from ?" and he answered, " I should say she was
suffering from arsenical poisoning." On cross-examination,
the witness further testified that he had.never seen a case of
arsenical poisoning, and never treated one, or seen one in his
practice, and -thatall he knows about it, in relation to the effects
of an irritant poison, was what he got from books and authorities that. he had read and consulted, and from what he was
taught at the medical college, without any practical knowledge
or experienoe aside from that.
The testimony of these two medical witnesses was very material, if not indispensable, in proving an important element of
the corpus delicti--that the deceased came to her death by
criminal means. Dr. Munro was her attending physician, and
upon his diagnosis, from actual observation of her symptoms,
depended all of the medical testimony in the case. The Court,
in instructing the jury, called their attention to the testimony
of Dr. Munro particularly. It is true that there were two other
medical witnesses who, in their practice, had each seen at least
one case of poisoning by arsenic, who testified in answer to an
hypothetical question embracing the symptoms testified to by
others, that such symptoms indicated arsenical poisoning, but
we cannot say that the verdict would have been the same without the testimony of Doctors Munro and Olmstead, and that
it was therefore immaterial. It seems to us that the jury must
have relied very much on their testimony. It is both surprising and unfortunate that upon such a long, difficult, and expensive trial of a case of murder in the first degree, the result
should have been hazarded upon such a question as that of the
qualification of the medical witnesses to give an opinion, that
the symptoms of the last sickness of the deceased indicated
poison by arsenic, when their disqualification was so apparent
in the light of a recent decision of this court. Neither Dr.
Munro nor Dr. Olmstead had ever seen a case, or had any
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experience whatever on the subject of arsenical poisoning, and
all that either of them knew upon the subject was derived from
medical or scientific books, and medical instruction. In receiving their testimony, the Court committed and repeated the very
error by reason of which the judgment in the case of Boyle v.
State (1883), 57 Wis. 472, was reversed.
In that case Dr. Cody was allowed to testify as to what
medical books and authorities said upon the subject of "strangulation," and that he did not know by experience of it, and
had no personal knowledge on the subject. That case was
unusually well considered, and the logic of the opinion is perfectly conclusive, and numerous authorities are cited to sustain the decision. Many cases in this State and elsewhere are
cited, to show that medical works and authorities could not be
read in evidence, and Mr. Justice TAYLOR well said: "Certainly,
if the book itself cannot be read in evidence to the jury, the
witness cannot be permitted to give extracts from it as evidence, depending upon his memory for their correctness. The
palpable error in permitting Dr. Cody is apparent from the fact
that he testified on the stand that he had no personal knowledge on the subject he was testifying about. He says, 'I have
not seen a case of strangulation, and do not- know by experience."' I have quoted the testimony of Doctors Munro and
Olmstead, by questions and answers, fuliy and correctly, that
the application of Boyle v. State might clearly appear. The
testimony of such medical witnesses is at best merely hearsaywhat medical books and teachers taught or told them, repeated
from memory. The learned counsel of the State asks this
Court to review and overrule that case as not supported by
authority. But it is supported by authority, and equally by
reason.
The decision was made deliberately, and we can see no
reason for revising or changing it. It is to be deplored that
it escaped the attention of the Court and the counsel of the
State, in a case of such serious consequences. The result and
consequence of such a palpable error must be the same as in
the case of Boyle v. State. The judgment must be reversed.
It is more important to the public and the State than the con-
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viction of the prisoner, that he be convicted, if at all, on legal
and competent evidence.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause
remanded for a new trial. The warden of the State prison will
surrender the plaintiff in error to the sheriff of Brown county,
who will hold him in custody until he shall be discharged by
due course of law.
The Court, in deciding the above
,case and in laying down the test of a
medical expert therein laid down, depends for its support upon the case
therein cited of Boyle v. State (i883),
57 Wis. 472, of its own State, which
'holds that a physician cannot be permitted to give extracts from medical
books as evidence, depending upon his
memory for their correctness.
This
latter case again depends upon the case
of Stilling v. Town of Thterp (1882),
54 Wis. 528, and numerous other cases
cited therein, wherein a well established
rule of evidence is followed, and that is,
that medical books cannot be introduced
or read in evidence. From this rule
the Court reasons, in Bylev. State, that
inasmuch as medical Vooks themselves
cannot be read or introduced in evidence, it would be improper and in
-violation of such ule to allow extracts
from such Looks to .e introduced by
way of the physician and his memory.
Thus far the reasoning seems sound and
logical, but to take the next step and
hold, as the Court in the case under
consideration does, with such ease and
such emphasis, that, inasmuch as medical books themselves cannot be received
in evidence, nor can a physician give
extracts from them as evidence, a physician, therefore, is incompetent to testify as an expert, by reason of the fact
that his knowledge of the subject matter is derived from such medical and
scientific books and from instruction
alone, without any practical experience,

is much more difficult and certainly
challenges very careful investigation.
In taking this step, it would seem
that the Court has failed to note any
difference between the case under consideration and those of B,,'le v. State
and Stilingv. Town of Thoile-in other
words, has failed to find any reasons'
why physicians, who have derived their
knowledge of a subject from books,
study and instruction alone, should be
admitted to te.tify, while the books
themselves, from which such knowledge
is derived, should not be admitted as
evidence.
The following reasons would seem to
distinguish these cases, and will be
found to be supported by authority, to
wit :
First. The reading of such books
would occupy too much of the time of
the court and nece -arily encumber and
prolong its proceedings.
Secon. It would be unsafe to take
one book as authority, and would necessitate the introduction of many.
Third. A jury is ignorant of the matters of which such books treat, and
cannot, of course, decide on their title
to credit: State v. Ferrell (1859), 12
Rich. (S. C. Law) 321.
Fourth. A physician, with his mind
trained and educated in such matters,
can compare and weigh authorities, and,
after careful research and study of the
same, can come to wiser and safer conclusions.
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Dtfindrwots.
[The term expert is derived from the
Latin word, expertus, meaning practiced, experienced, skilled, and is defined to include one who is instructed
by experience: Bouvier's Law Dict.;
Anderson's Law Dict.; ,1-rydev. Woolfolk (x855), I Iowa 159, 167; Estate of
Toombes (188o), 54 Cal. 509, 512-3.
"An expert is defined to be a person
that possesses peculiar skill and knowledge upon the subject matter that he is
requiredto give an opinion upon:" State
v. Phair(1875), 48 Vt. 366, 377The Court, in Dole v.Johnson (1870),
5o N. H. 453, however, in commenting,
said: "This definition is, perhaps, too
narrow, for we must concede that there
may be, in many instances and individuals, a higher degree of knowledge, not
derived from, nor perfected, or enhanced by,a great amount, or even any
degree of practical experience."
("We have endeavored to express
the opinion of this Court upon the first
question, that the disease of foot-rot in
sheep, is a subject upon which the opinion of an expert can be received. Upon
the second question, that the qualifications necessary to entitle Mr. Waite to
testify are these: he must either be a
veterinary doctor, qualified by some
reading and study, as such, and having
some practical experience in healing
diseases of domestic animals, even
though not practically acquainted with
the disease of foot-rot in sheep, or else
he must be really a man of science,
qualified by a previous habit and course
of attention, observation and special
study, in the direction of the subject
matter of his testimony:" per FOSTER,
J., Id. 459. Here the witness testified,
that, as editor of a stock journal, he had
read extensively on the subject of footrot; and he named the works on that
subject, which he had read. lie al-o
testified that he had had no practical

experience in the treatment of sheep for
any disease: Id. 452.
"An expert muSt have made the subject upon, which he gives his opinion, a
matter of particular study, practice, or
observation, and he must have particular
and special knowledge on the subject :"
DoE,J., Jones v. Tucker (i86o), 41 N.
H. 546,548.
Men of Science.
[In the leading case on the admissibility of matter of opinion, Lord MANSFIELD said: "Mr. Smeaton understands the construction of harbors, the
cause of their destruction, and how remedied. In matters of science no other.
witnesses can be called. An instance
frequently occurs in actions for unskilfully navigating ships. The question
then depends on the evidence of those
who understand such matters; and
when such questions come before me, I
always send for some of the brethren of
the Triniy House. I cannot believe
that where the question is, whether a
defect arises from'a natural or an artificial cause, the opinions of men of science are not to be received :" Folkes v.
Chadd (1782), 3 Doug. 157, 159.

Persons of Skill.
[" On questions of science and trade,
or others of the same kind, persons of
skill may, no doubt, be permitted to give
their opinions in evidence; because the
jury, being wholly unacquainted with
the particulars on which such opinions
are founded, would be unable to draw
any correct conclusion from hearing
them stated ; for instance, was a physician to state the particular medicine administered to a patient; from being unacquainted with the operation and effect
of such medicine, the jury would be
wholly incompetent to judge, whether
such treatment would probably produce
the death of the patient or not. * * * *
In these, and similar cases, it is from
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the opinion of persons skilled in the
particular science or trade, and dealing
in the particular article, that satisfactory
evidence may be obtained; but when
the necessity of admitting such evidence ceases, the exceptions to the general rule also cease :" GREEK, J., Rochester v. Chester (1826), 3 N. H. 349,
365. Under the stress of these last
words, real estate experts were not allowed to testify to the value of a small
piece of ground.
Experienced Persons.
[In Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson (1869),
63 Pa. 146, 151, SHARSWVOOD, J., said"An expert, as the word imports, is one
having had experience. No clearly defined rule is to be found in the books, as
to what constitutes an expert. Much
depends upon the nature of the question in regard to which an opinion is
asked. There are some matters of
which every man, with ordinary opportunities of observation, is able to form a
reliable opinion: Wilkinson v. 2Ofose/ey
(1857), 3o Ala. 562; Dewitt v. Bailey
(1858), 17 N. Y. 340. It is not necessary, as it is said in one case, to call a
drover or butcher to prove the value of
a cow: Ohio R. R. Co. v. frwin (1862),
27 I11.
178. Nor is it imperatively required that the business or profession of
the witness should be that which would
enable him to form an opinion: Van
Deusen v. Young (1858), 29 Barb. 9;
Smit v.Hill(1856), 22 Id.656; Price
v. Powell (1850), 3 Comstock (N.Y.)
322; Fowler v. Mfiddlelon (1863), 6
Allen (Mass.) 92.
In Philli~ps v.
Gregg (r840), io Watts (Pa.) I58,witnesses who were not lawyers by profession, were received to testify as to what
constituted a lawful marriage in the settlements of the Mississippi valley half a
century before. While, undoubtedly, it
must appear that the witness had enjoyed some means of special knowledge
or experience, no rule can be laid down,

in the nature of things, as to the extent
of it. It must be for the jury to judge
of the extent of it."
In this case a
steam-fitter, with no knowledge of stills
beyond that acquired from working on
them, was allowed to testify as to the
sufficiency of the strength of the iron
used.
[In the case of Phillipts v. Grege,
just cited, ROGERS, J., said--(l. 169)"Foreign unwritten laws, customs and.
usages, may be proved, and must ordinarilybe proved byparol evidence. And
the usual course is to make such proof
by the testimony of competent witnesses, instructed in the law, under oath.
But although these are the usual modes
of authentication, yet they may be relaxed, or changed, as necessity, either
physical or moral, may require, where
there is reason to believe they are unattainable, and where a rigid adherence
to them may probably produce extreme
inconvenience or manifest injustice. In
short, the peculiar circumstances of the
case must enter largely into the consideration of the question of the competency of the evidence."
[" There is a class of cases, however,
depending upon questions involving a
degree of skill and judgment such as is
necessarily confined to a few individuals, exercising a particular science, art
or profession. Such cases form an exception to the rule laid down, and the
jury must necessarily depend, in the determination of such questions, not upon
the exercise of their own judgments
upon the facts, but upon the opinions
and conclusions of others. It is manifest that this class of cases should not
be unnecessarily extended, and that the
opinions of experienced persons, in
matters of skill and judgment, should
not be admitted, except where they are
ihe only means by which the jury can
come to a correct conclusion :" UPHAM,
J., Peterborough v. Jaffrey (1833), 6
N. H. 462,463. And, accordingly, the
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Of PracticalSkill or Sciecndfic Mhowleage and Experience.
[Where a locomotive had exploded
Of ParticularSdence or Skill.
and killed the engineer, it was insisted,
by the railroad company, "that the tes[" It is often very difficult to determine in regard to what particular mat- timony of certain witnesses, whose octers and points witnesses may give testi- cupation was that of boiler makers, was
mony, by way of opinion. It is doubt- improperly received, as by their own
ful whether all the cases can be har- testimony, they were incompetent to
testify as experts. They all showed
monized, or brought within any general
rule or principle. The most compre- that, for a long time, they had been enhensive and accurate rule upon the gaged in making boilers, and some of
them showed experience in testingboilsubject we believe to be as follows:
ers. They testified to their knowledge
That the opinion of witnesses possesand experience, as to the matters ensing peculiar skill is admissible, whenever the subject 'matter of inquiry is quired of. Their testimony was clearly
such that inexperienced persons are un- competent. The amount of weight to
which their testimony was entitled, was
likely to prove capable of forming a
a question for the jury to determine.
correct judgment upon it, without such
Courts cannot establi-h a standard by
assistance; in other words, when it so
which to measure expert witnesses. If
far partakes of the nature of a science
they show that they have practical skill,
as to require a course of previous habit
or scientific knowledge and experience,
or study, in order to the attainment of a
knowledge of it :" DAY, J., Muldouney as to the mauers under investigation,
they are competent to testify :" REESE,
v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. (1873), 36 Iowa
462,473. And brakemen, conductors *J., S. C. & P. R. R. Co. v. Finlayson
(x88I), 16 Neb. 578, 587.
and baggage masters were held incompetent to give an opinion upon the danA Skillful or ExperiencedPerson.
ger of coupling cars.
[On an issue of insanity, it was con:
["The opinion of the witness,respecting the value of the sled, was not ad- tended that the trial judge erred in remissible in evidence: Rochesterv. Ches- fusing to permit a consulting physician,
ter (1826), 3 N. H. 349; Peterborough, Dr. Russell, "to give his opinion, based
upon what he learned from the nurse
v.Jaffrey (1833), 6 Id. 462. He was
and wife of the defendant and of the
not a manufacturer of sleds, if that
attending physician, taken in connecnor
skill,
might be supposed to indicate
was he otherwise possessed of any par- tion with his personal examination. It
is asserted that the information obtained
ticular science, or skill, respecting their
from those sources became part of the
construction or use. Thi fact that he
personal examination of the witness,
in
genpeople
than
more
had used sleds
and, as such, formed a proper basis for
eraL, and had bought and sold many,
a professional opinion which would be
more
had
be
that
show
might serve to
competent and legitimate evidence in
knowledge respecting the best form and
case; and, further, that the profesthe
which
at
price
the
size, and respecting
sional skill which would authorize the
they could be purchased or sold, than
witness to testify to his opinions conmany others; but this is not sufficient to
give him the character of an expert :" cerning the malady of a patient whom
he has examined, authorizes him also to
PARKER, C. J., Beard v. Mirk (1840),
judge of the proper sources, in connec.
xx N. H. 397, 400.

evidence of real estate experts, as to the
ordinary value of land, was excluded.
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tion with his personal examination, from
wlich to derive these opinions. * * * *

The proposition contains two fundamental errors. First, it makes the witness decide the question of the competency of evidence, thus putting him in
the place of the Court. Next, while it
excludes the declarations as incompetent testimony to go to the jury, it receives, as competent evidence, an opinion based upon that incompetent testimony, thus attempting to elevate the
stream above the fountain, to make a
corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. * *
As a witness cannot be permitted to
give his opinion as an expert, until it
appears, by a pieliminary examination,
that he is a person of skill in the particular department, or subject matter in
which his opinion is desired; so, too, it
must appear that he has reliable information, or knowledge of the facts involved, and upon which his opinion is
to 1.6 founded, before he can testify as
'

an expert. * 4 * The very foundation

for the theory of expert testimony is
that of his superior knowledge in relation to the subject matter of which he
is permitted to give an opinion, by
which he, in a degree, assumes the
functions of the jury." RICE, J., Ifeald
v. Thing (185S), 45 Me. 392, 395.
[" In the examination of experts, it is
only necessary to keep constantly in

view that their proper office is to instruct
the Court and jury, in matters so far
removed from the ordinary pursuits of
life, that accurate knowledge of them
can only be acquired by continued study
and experience; the purpose is to enable
both the Court and jury to judge intelligently of the force and application of
the facts introduced in evidence, as they
would have been able to do if they had
been persons properly instructed upon
the subjects involed:"
CLARK, J.,
CQyle v. Comm. (1883), 1o4 Pa. X17.

This was said, as the introduction to a
d;scussion of the form of questions, to

be put to an expert, for his opinion upon
the facts in evidence upon a trial for
murder.
Skill'fil or Scientific Men.
[" As a general rule, the opinion of
witnesses is not admissible in evidence.
They must speak to facts within their
knowledge. But upon questions of skill
or science, with which a jury may not
be supposed to be familiar, men who
have made the subject matter of inquiry,
the object of their particular attention
or study, are competent to give their
opinion. It must, however, be first
shown that they are skillful or scientific
men, or at least that they have superior
actual skill or scientific knowledge in
relation to the question, before their
opinions can be competent. Mere opportunity for observation is not sufficient. * **
In the present case, Stephen Walker was permitted to give his
opinion as to the quality of the soapstone in the quarry in controversy. This
was peculiarly a question of scientific
skill and knowledge, which the witness
was not shown to possess. It only appeared that he had been more or less
engaged for forty years in quarrying
soapstone. * * But it did not appear
that he had ever devoted any time or
study to an investigation of the composition and characteristics of soapstone,
or made any particular observations on
that subject, so as to be better qualified
to give an opinion on the scientific question propounded to him, than any member ofthejury:" FOWLER, J., PageV.
Parker(IS6O), 40 N. I. 47, 59.
In Central Railroad v. Mlitchell
(1879), 63 Ga. '73, [a witness was allowed to testify "that he was a civil engineer, had surveyed railroads, including this particular road at the place of
the accident. He gave -considerable
amount of evidence as to the depth,
width, etc., of the cut," where an engineer was hurt by the derailment of his
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locomotive through the washing down
of the side of the cut. The witness
also said-" The rules for construction
of cuts, etc., which I have given, are
found in books on engineering. I give
these rules solely from what I recollect
of the books. These rules are found in
Mahan, Gillespie and Gilmore, and
many others :" Id. p. 177. JACKSON,
J., said-" The expert was competent
to testify. Every expert derives much
of his knowledge from books as well as
from experience, and can give his opinion based upon the knowledge acquired
from both sources :" Id. 18o.
Summaly.
From the above authorities and definitions it will be seen that the word
"experience" is used many times, but
in most cases is either so qualified, or
used in the alternative, as to remove its
necessity.

NAecessity of Ex.perience.
In the case of Fairchildv. Bascomb
(1862), 35 Vt. 398,41o, the Court says,
in passing, that a person who was merely by education a physician, if he had
not practiced his profession, would not
be deemed admissible as an expert, but
does not base its decision on this point,
as the case was opened up on other
grounds. [However, in another branch
of the case, the Court said: "Persons
who are much accustomed to attend
upon the sick, to watch the progress of
diseases to their end, -and to be with
the dying, are, by their experience, enabled to form a better judgment as to
the cause of disease and its probable
effect upon the body and mind in the
last hours of life, than others who have
no such opportunity. Physicians who
are in general practice, and nur~es, thus
become experts in such matters, so far
as experience and observation can furnish knowledge. * * * In such cases,
however, there is so little uniformity in

the effects of diseases upon the mind
just before death, that the mere opinion
of a physician as to the matter, would
obviously be evidence greatly inferior
in value to the actual observation of an
intelligent bystander:" ALDis, J.,Id.
4o8, 409. This decision does not seem
to agree with those just cited, nor with
the principal case: See infra, under
Profession or Occupation and Experience, both necessary. The same court
denied the attril,ute of expert to one
merely experienced, in Oakes v. lVeston,
(873), 45 Vt. 430, where the Court excluded one, who was asked his opinion
upon the unreasonableness of a load,
from experience in driving over the
same road.
[In this connection it maybe observed
that one who had attended the deceased
as his physician and was called "Doe
tor," and had attended to a drug store
for some years, but was not a physician,
was admitted by the same court to testify as an expert. The proof "addressed
itself to the jury, and under a proper
direction fioin the Court, should have
induced the jury to accord little weight
to the professional opinions of the witness:" COLLIER, C. J.,Washington v.
Cole (1844), 6 Ala. 212, 214.

a-er as an Expert in Another Profession.
[See, also, sip ra, under Experenced
Pe sons.

[Where a lawyer, who had been in
practice for sixteen years, was called as
a medical expert upon the diseases of
women, he was admitted upon his statement that lie had, previously to his admission to the bar;attended a course of
medical lectures, and had obtained a
license from the State board of physicians, under which he had practiced
medicine for one year. The witness
also stated that he had continued to
read medical works and felt competent

SOQUET V. THE STATE.

to express an opinion: Tul& v.
(1847), 12 Ala. 648.

-dd

["' One who exercises an art or trade
is supposed to be acquainted wih it.
Thus, a practicing physician would be
presumed, from that circumstance alone,
to be acquainted with the cause, and
cure, of diseases; but it by no means
follows that one who is not in the actual
practice of medicine may not be skilled
in the science, so as to be able to give
correct opinions as to the existence, or
cause, of disease. Clinical practice is
doubtless a most efficient mode of acquiring such knowledge, by enabling
the practitioner, from his own observation, to verify the assertions, or theories,
of others, or to correct errors into which
they may have fallen; and it may be
that medical opinions not brought
to this test, are not worthy of much
reliance as the basis of a verdict
of a jury. But, if one asserts an ability
to give correct opinions upon any art, or
science, from an acquaintance with the
subject, acquired by observation and
study, we cannot perceive on what
ground he can be rejected, because he
has not been in the actual practice of
his profession. This circumstance, as
already observed, may deprive his testimony of much weight with the jury, but
it is no ground for excluding it. So
also, among physicians in actual practice, superior skill, greater power, or opportunity for observation, may. entitle
the opinions of one, to much greater
weight than those of another, although
both are equally competent in legal estimation :" OtMOND, J., Id. 649-5o.

[This case was affirmed in Rash v.
State (t878), 61 Ala. 89, 95.
On the other hand, in MissouriPac.
R'y Co. v. Finley (1888), 38 Kan. 550,
HORTON, C. J., said: "Upon the trial,
C.W. Johnson who testified that he was a
lawyer, by profession, and not a doctor or
veterinary surgeon, was allowed to give
his opinion as to the symptoms and

causes of Texas fever; and, also, was
permitted to testify that the cattle communicating the Texas fever to domestic
cattle in this State, came from that part
of Texas south of latitude thirty-five.
In order to determine whether the witness was competent as an expert, the
following examination was bad: Q. I
will ask you if you have read a great
deal upon the subject of Texas cattle?
A. Yes, sir. Q. And your information
is principally derived from the knowledge you have derived from reading in
regardtoit? A. Frombooks; yes, sir.
Q. Some little observfition? A. Yes,
sir; from the testimony of experts, taken
in a case in which I have been interested as a lawyer. Q. Case in court?
A. Yes, sir. Q. The principal portion,
if not all, is from knowledge derived
from books and the testimony of experts
in court? A. Yes, sir. Upon this testimony, it does not appear to us that the
witness possessed the legal qualifications
of an expert. Where a person has been
educated in a particular profession, as a
physician, surgeon, or veterinarian, he
is presumed to understand thoroughly
the questions pertaiiing to his profession; but a person, not a member of
those professions, who has read extensively from books and heard the testimony of experts in court, in regard to
the diseases of men or cattle, is not considered an expert concerning the same :"
Id. 56o-i.
[So, in IRass v. Mfarshall, decided
May 25, x888, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held a practicing attorney
incompetent to testify as to the chemical
purity of certain .whiskey.
He bad
never been a practicing chemist, ankd
could not make a quantitative or qualitative analysis, except as directed by a
pamphlet on the subject of adulterated
liquors; had studied medicine for three
years; had been at the bar for fotty
years.
[The tendency of the latter decisions
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zinc bynistake for Epsomsalts," a supposed medical expert" was permitted
"to testify to the effects of sulphate of
zinc when taken into the system, from
what he learned on the subject from
books of recognized authority. The
evidence was not incompetent. Collier
v. Simson (1831), 5 C. & P. 73; Taylor v. The Railway (1869), 48 N. H.
304. It was not very satisfactory expert
evidence, but its weight was for the
jury :" COOLEY,J., Brown v. Marshall
Profession or Occuation, withkcu Ex(1882), 47 Mich. 576, 578.
nce.
A physician having no practical exAny practicing physician is compeperience in analysis of poison, but actent to express an opinion, as an expert,
quainted with the means of detecting
on a medical question: Livingston's it, is competent as an expert: State v.
Case (1857), 14 Grat. (Va.) 592 ; State Hinkle (x858), 6 Iowa 380. [The
v. Clark (188x), x5 Shand (S. C.) 403.
prisoner was convicted of murder by
[" Doctor Addy, as stated in the repoison. "Two physicians were called
port" of the trial judge, "was an exand testified as to the tests applied in
perienced physician, and was, in law, the chemical analysis made of the
an expert as to all matters embraced
stomach of the deceased, and also of
within the range of his profession. Had
the tests usually applied for detecting
he seed the dead body, therefore, when
the existence of poison in such cases.
first found on the railroad track, there
Both of them testified that they were
could be no doubt that his opinion, as
practicing physicians. One of them
to the length of time it had been dead,
stated that he was not a professional
would be competent, on the ground that
chemist, but understood some of the
he was an expert, and this fact is within
practical details of chemistry--that porthe range of his profession. But this
tion, at least, which pertained to his
principle, as appears from the authority
profession; that he had no practical
already cited," x Greenteaf Ev. 44o,
experience in the analysis of poisons,
"does not confine the opinion of the
until, in connection with Doctor Francis,
expert, to facts coming under his own
he analyzed the contents of the stomach
observation alone, but it permits him to of the deceased; that since that time he
found and express his opinion upon
had conducted experiments upon a small
facts testified to by others. This was scale; and that he was previously ac31 that was done in this case, and the
quainted with the means of detecting
luthority from Greenleaf seems to be
poisons, and had since had some expedirectly in point. It fully warranted, in
rience in that way. The other testified
our judgment, the ruling of the circuit
that he was not a practical chemist;
judge as to the competency of Doctor
that he did not follow the science as a
Addy's opinion:" SIMPSON, C. J., State profession; that he understood the
chemical tests by which the presence
v. Clark (188i), x5 Shand (S. C.) 403,
4o8. The doctor examined the body
of strychnine can be detected; that he
after it had been removed to the rail- professed to understand the principles
of chemistry, as laid down in the books
road station.
on that science; that he never experi[Where a druggist sold sulphate of

wotdd seemr to be governed by the
maxim: the law is a jealous mistress.
[The principle involved in the second
of these cases was asserted by the Supreme Court of Michigan,in HWickesBros.
v. Swij/ E. L.Co.,decided May 18, 1888.
A witness was not allowed to testify as
an expert, when his qualifications were
theresult ofconversationwith mechanics
and machinists about the cost of altering
an engine.
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mented with a view to detect strychnine
by chemical tests; that he had seen experiments by professors of chemistry;
and that there was one test much relied
on, the trial of which he had witnessed.
Defendant objected to these witnesses
as incompetent, and now urges that they
did not show themselves possessed of
the requiite professional skill. We
think they were competent witnesses :"
WRIGHT, C. J.,Id. 385-6.
[" It is, of course, desirable that great
caution should be exercised in conducting experiments of this character," that
is, in analyzing the contents of a stomach
in case of death from supposed poisoning by strychnine, "and that the most
skillful professional aid should be secured. If conducted, however, by such
as have not had experience, or by those
who, though not practical chemists, give
their opinions from knowledge derived
from the books upon that science, such
opinions would be entitled to less weight
than if given by a practical chemist-he
who bases his conclusions upon experience as well as books. The means of
knowledge are proper to be considered
by the jury, and they should give, or
withhold, credence in the opinion given,
as they may believe the expert qualified
to speak more or less intelligently and
understandingly. But to say that none
shall be permitted to give their opinions,
except those of the highest professional
skill, or those who had given their lives
to chemical experiments, would, in this
country at least, render it impossible, in
most cases, to find the requisite skill
and ability :" WRIGHT, C. J., State V.
11inkle (1858), 6 Iowa 380, 386.
[Where the seller of a horse was sued
for breach of warranty of soundness, a
medical witness for the defendant" had
already stated that he had read various
standard authors on the subject of diseases, and had given his own opinion,
in respect to the character of the disease
of which the animal died. Certainly it

was proper, at that stage of the inquiry,
to ask the witness for his best medical
opinion, according to the best authority :" JOHNSON, J., Piersonv. Ioag
(1866), 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 243, 246.
Professionor Occupation, and Experience, both A'ecessary.
[This is the doctrine of the principal
case, and is not without some support
from other c,,urts. It was strongly affirmative of the remark of TAYLOR, J.,
in Boyle v. State (x883), 57 Wis. 472,
cited in the principal case, supra, 485.
This position had been taken by the
court as far back as I849, where the
court below refused to allow a medical
expert called in a case of nuisance from
the erection of a mill-dam, to answer
the question, "Is it not a well ascertained fact in medical science that the
malaria spoken of will not cross a.
stream ?" STow, C. J., in affirming this
ruling, said: "1Was it in:ended that the
witness should testify from his ' scientific
knowledge,' derived from medical and
philosophical works, as to facts, or,
rather, examples and particular experiments therein related? or was he to
speak from his 'scientific knowledge,'
derived from his personal examination
of certain ditches? If from the latter,
the question was in no wise different
from many others which were permitted
to be answered. If from the former,
the testimony would have been mere
hearsay :" Lining v. 7he State (x849),
2 Pin. (Wis.) 284,288.
The case of Emerson v. Lowell Gas
Ligfht Co. (2863), 6 Allen (Mass.) 146,
holds that the mere fact that the witness "was a physician, would not prove
that he had any knowledge of gas, without the further proof as to his experience; for it is notorious that many persons practice medicine who are without
learning; and a physician may have
much professional learning without being acquainted with the properties of
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gas, or its effects on health:" CHAPUAN, J., p. 148.
[Wharton notices this decision,as contrary to his own statement that an ex.pert "need not be exhaustively acquainted with the d'fferentia of the
specific specialty under consideration,"
and adds, "If this were necessary, few
experts could be admitted to testify;
certainly no courts could be found capable of determining whether such exA general
perts were competent.
knowledge of the department to which
the specialty belongs would seem to be
enough. Thus, a physician, not an
oculist, has been permitted to testify as
to injuries of the eye" (Castner v.
Sliker (1868), 33 N.J. L. 95, 507;
Statev. Sheets (1883), 89 N. C. 543),
and other examples: i Whart. Ev.
S439.
[The second of %harton's citations is
apt to the present annotation. "Dr.
Lewis stated that he had attended lectures at amedical college and had practiced his profession for seven years;
that, although he had never been called
to a case of poisoning, he had experimented some with poison on dogs and
other animals, and he thought he was
qualified to give an opinion as to the
effects of poison. Dr. Bulla testified
that he had been a practicing physician
since 1845, and he had had some experience bf the effect of poison on the
human species, but very little in regard
to brute animals, and he thought he was
competent, to a certain extent, to give
an opinion. There was no error in the
ruling of his Honor, that both of these
physicians were competent to testify as
experts. When the professors of science, as physicians, for inbtance, swear
that they are able to pronounce an opinion in any particular case, although
they say, at the same time, that precisely such a case had not before fallen
under their observation, or under their
notice in the course of their reading, it

is competent to give in evidence, their
opinion: State v. Clark (1851), 12
To the same effect
Ired. (N. C.) 15.
is Horton v. Green (1870), 64 N. C. 64,
which was an action to recover damages
for deceit in the sale of a mule alleged
to have glanders. One Dr. Rivers was
examined, who had been practicing his
profession for eleven years. When asked
whether, front his general knowledge of
disease, he could tell whether the symptoms, in that case, indicated that the
disease was of long standing or not, he
answered that he had no particular acquaintance with the diseases of stock,
but from his books, observation and
general knowledge of diseases of the
human family, he could tell whether
certain symptoms indicated that a disease of recent or long standing, though
he had never seen a case of glanders,
unless that was one. It was objected
that the witness had not qualified himself to answer as an expert, but this
Court held that he was competent:"
ASHE, J., State v. Sheets (ISS 3 ), 89 N.
C. 543, 549Post Mlortem Examination.
In State v. Cole (1883), 63 Iowa 695,
[the defendant was convicted of poisoning his wife, while in childbirth.
Upon appeal, the defendant assigned
"as error, that the Court erred in allowing certain physicians to testify, as
experts, to having made a po;t mortemz
examination, and to having fund indications of arsenic in the stomach of the
deceased. * * * * The physicians who
testified, were shown merely to be physicians of considerable length of standing in practice. Whether such persons
should have been held to be qualified
to testify as experts, in respect to the
.Post morten examination, and indications of arsenic, is a question upon
which we are not entirely agreed. The
.Post mortemz examination of a human
stomach, for the detection of indications
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of poison, does not necessarily come
within the experience of a medical practitioner. But toxicology is treated as a
branch of medical jurisprudence, and
it may be regarded as belonging to medical science. On a question, then, as to
whether a person is qualified to make a
post mortem examination of a human
stomach, and testify to indications of
arsenic, it would be proper to allow evidence that he is a medical practitioner.
We do not say that the Court, upon
such fact alone being shown, should
necessarily allow him to testify. We
merely say that, if he is admitted
upon such fact, the Court does not act
wholly without evidence. This matter
of passing upon expert qualifications is
not one that is subject to very well defined rules. * * * It may be conceded
that when a witness is offered as an
expert, the Court would not be justified
in allowing him to testify against the
objection of the party, against whom he
was offered, until some evidence was
introduced that the witness was pos.
sessed of the requisite character. Where,
however, as in this case, the witness has
once been admitted by the Court to testify, the weight that should be given to
his testimony becomes a question for
the jury, and in a proper case theywould
be justified, doubtless, in disregarding
his testimony entirely:" ADAMS, J., Id.
698, 699, 702.
[Upon an indictment for murder,
charged to have been caused by an
effort to produce an aboition, "a witness
testified that he was an experienced
medical man, and that he made a post
mortem examination of the body. He
was then asked by the counsel for the
State whether he believed the deceased
had been with child, and, if so, what
were his reasons for such belief. This
question was objected to. But it was
allowed, on the ground that the witness
was an expeit; and he stated his belief
that she had been pregnant, and de-

scribed the appearances of the body,
which led to that belief. He was also,
against the objection of defendant's
counsel, allowed to offer his-opinion as
to the cause of her death :" State vSmith (1851), 32 Me. 369, 370.

[See, also, supra,Profession, or Occu.pation,without Experience.
Symptoms of Poison.

In State v. Terrell (x859), 12 Rich.
Law (S. C.) 321 [the defendant was
convicted of murder by poisoning and
appealed for a new trial, on the ground
that medical witnesses, who admitted
that they had not themselves seen the
human system under the known operation of strychnine, were permitted to
testify from information confessedly derived from their books what effects were
produced by it on the system, and, consequently, what were the symptoms of
poisoning by strychnine. "The character and effects of strychnine were
properly inquired into from the physicians. It is but recently known as a
.poison,and the most experienced physicians have had little opportunity of
judging of its effects on the human system from cases within their practice.
Five medical men were examined, only
two had had the opportunity of testing
its effects. But they are concurred in
pronouncing that the cases under their
treatment and observation, at this time,
were affected by strychnia. Their judgments were formed from their previous
course of habit andstudy. * * * * But
a medical man, having acquired his
knowledge from books, lectures and
oral instruction, is prepared to decide,
upon the character of the poison, and
its effects, and his title to credit, both
scientifically and otherwise, can be
judged of, from his examination, by the
jury :" O'NEALL, J., Id. 328.
[Upon a trial for murder by the same
poison, EAKIN, J.,Polk Y. State (1880),
36 Ark. 117, 123, 124, said-" Itshould
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have been first shown that Dr. Curtis
was qualified to speak as an expert,
from study and experience in medicine.
It would not have been objectionable,
then, to have asked him to describe,
generally, the symptoms of strychnine,
in the human system, because these are
facts of science, depending upon the
course of nature, although coming seldom under the observation of others
than experts in medicine. And if it
had stopped there, it would have been
competent for the jury to have compared
-the symptoms testified to by the witnesses with those given by the expert,
as to the usual effects of strychnine, as
affording some tendency to prove the
manner of the death."
[See, also, supra, under Professionor
Occupation andExoerienee,both necessary'.
-Effect of DrugsA physician, testifying as an expert,
to the effect of oil of savin, in producing an abortion, may give an opinion
founded upon his reading and study
alone: State v. Wood (1873), 53 N. H.
484. [1" It is settled, in Taylor v. Rail-ay (1869), 48 N. H. 304. * * * This
case, we think, fully sanctions the direct examination of this witness, upon
a subject where his knowledge was derived from books alone; and the crossexamination was simply the testing of
the correctness of his opinion by the
same standard upon which the opinion
was founded,--the authority ofthe medical books which he had read. * * *
He had stated, as well he might, on direct examination, his knowledge of a
particular subject, not from any experience or actual observation, but from
what he had derived merely from reading and studying medical authorities.
Then he was cross-examined as to that
general reading, not by putting in the
books, but by inquiries whether, in his
general reading, he had not found particVOL. XXXVII.- 3 2

ular theories laid down, conflicting with
the theory he had advanced as the result
of his reading. Collier v. Simpson
(1831),5 Car. &Payne 73, goes further
than the present case. There TINDAL, C.
J.,
in speaking of a medical expert, says:
'I think you may ask the witness
whether, in the course of his reading, he
has found this laid down.' And that
was upon direct examination: ".SAGENT, C. J., Id. 494, 495.
Mental Condition.
[Where, on an issue of devisavilvel
non, and allegations of undue influence
and want of a sound and disposing
mind, both of the attending physicians
in the last illness "were rightly permitted
to testify to their opinion of" the testator's "mental capacity, immediately before and after the execution of his will,
accompanied by the symptoms and appearances upon which that opinion was
formed," though neither physician had
any special skill in mental diseases and
had never attended the testator previous
to his last illness of only four days' duration: Hastings v. Rider (868),
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Mass. 622, 623, 674, 627. This case
was really affirmative of Baxter v. Abbott (1856), 7 Gray (Mass.) 71. Tothe
same effect, though the physician was
not in attendance, but acquainted : Bitner v. Bitner (1870), 65 Pa. 347. Contra, Russell v. State (1876), 53 Miss.
367.
[" The State introduced Doctor
Brock," in a trial for murder, "who
testified that he was a physician and
surgeon of fourteen years' practice and
experience, had studied psychological
medicine some, and had had experience
in the incipiency of mental diseases.
The witness then testified as to certain
methods of investigating the sanity or
insanity of a person, and was then asked
this question: "Would not the manner
in which the act was done, the circumstances of the case, the absence or pres-
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ence of apparent motive, and the whole
details of the transaction, be considered
by scientific men in determining the
question of sanity or insanity?" This
question was objected to, because the
witness had not shown that he had
made disease of the mind a special
study. The objection was overruled,
and, we think, correctly.
Ile had
brought himself within the rule admitting his testimony as an expert. See i
Greenleaf Ev.,
44o. The extent of
the witness's knowledge of a particular
branch of medical science, only goes to
the credibility of his testimony: Ki. CMAN, C. J., State v. Rcddick (1871), 7
Kan. 143, 15o. To the same effect,
Davis v. The State (1871), 35 Ind. 496.
Specialist not Required.
[Where a life insurance company
defended against the payment of a policy
on the ground of suicide, practicing
physicians and surgeons were admitted
as experts, without showing that they
had made insanity a specialty: Hathaway's Admr. v. Nat'lL. Ins. Co. (1875),
48 VL 335. Similarly, Barnes v. Ingalls (1863), 39 Ala. 193, in the case of
a photographer called to testify to the
value of the services of a photograph
painter.
[See also, supra, Afental Condition.
Amount of Experience.
In Gilmore v. Brost, decided September 5, x888, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota held competent a practicing
physician and surgeon, in a case for
damages for the value of a mare, alleged
to have been killed by negligent handling of a stallion. The witness "had
had more or less veterinary experience
while practicing medicine; and, to use
his own words, was familiar, 'to a
moderate extent,' with the anatomy of
the iorse."
[" The testimony of Doctors Cotting
Cheever and Foye was properly ad-

mitted.

All of these witnesses were

present at the autopsy of the murdered
child and examined her head, and no
question was made as to their competency as medical experts. The only
part of the testimony objected to at the
trial was that to the effect that, in their
opinion, the injuries to the head could
not have been produced at the same
time and by one blow. This subject
was within the range of the experience
of medical experts accustomed to observe the effect of blows upon the human
head, and was one upon which their
judgment would aid the jury:" MORTON,
J., Comm. v. Piper (1876), i2o Mass.
185, 189.
Sources of Information : See under
a sk I/ful or experienced Person, ant
skillful or scient/6c men, stp a.
WVeight of Opinion.
[In Grigsbf v. Clear Lake Water
Co. (1870), 40 Cal. 396, 405, TEMPLE,
J., in delivering the opinion of the Court,
said-" Ordinarily, it is true, witnesses
testify only as to facts, leaving it to the
jury to draw their conclusions, but upon
matters of science and questions requiring peculiar skill, an exception is made.
These witnesses ought, perhaps, to be
selected by the Court, and should be impartial, as well as learned and skillful.
A contrary practice, however, is now
probably too well established to allow
the more salutary rule to be enforced,
but it must be painfully evident to every
practitioner that these witnesses are generally but adroit advocates of the theory
upon which the party calling them relies, rather than impartial experts, upon
whose superior judgment and learning
the jury can safely rely. Even men of
the highest character and integrity are
apt to be prejudiced in favor of the party
by whom they are employed. And, as
a m.ttcr of course, no expert is called
until the party calling him is assured
that his opinion will be favorable. Such
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evidence should be received with great
caution by the jury, and never allowed,
except upon subjects which require unusual scientific attainments or peculiar
skill."
On a trial for murder by poisoning by
arsenic "the physician whose opinion
was excepted to at the trial, was competent from his long experience in the
practice of his profession" (for forty
years), "and with the knowledge and
information he was shown to have of
the symptoms of the malady of the deceased, to testify as an expert. It was
for the jury to decide whether his testimony should influence their verdict, for,
or against, the defendant:" MANNING,
J., Aitchell v. The State (IS77), 58 Ala.
417, 48.
[" Where, on cross-examination, the"
medical "witness said that if he had
not been informed that there was arsenic in the house, he would not have
concluded that the sickness and death
were caused from poison by arsenic,
but, learning this fact, he came to the
conclusion he did, from observation of
the symptoms of the case, and from
having heard that Sam Hooks had arsenic in the house; certainly this acknowledgment greatly impaired the

force of his testimony as evidence
against the pri-oner, Lut it was not inadmisbible. There was no error in the
refusal to rule it out :" MANNING, J.,
J]Iitchellv. The State (1877), 58 Ala.
417, 419-20.
[On a trial for manslaughter, opposing medical witnesses were interrogated as to the reputation of the physician who attended the wounded man,
though the capacity of such physician
was not otherwise impeached. This
was error, PETERS, J., saying-" A physician is an expert, and as such he may
be asked questions which develop his
capacity to form a correct judgment
upon the experiences of his profession;
but his reputation has nothing to do
with this; and it can only be sustained
when it is impeached:" DePhue v.
State (1870), 44 Ala. 32, 39.
The better rule would seem to be that
actual experience is not necessary to
render a plh~sician competent as an expert on a particular question, but that
lack of it may and should be considered
by the jury, in connection with his other
qualifications, in determining the weight
to be given to his testimony.
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